Reconciliation in the Wake of Tragedy: Cambodia\u27s Extraordinary Chambers Undermines the Cambodian Constitutiton by Capeloto, Tessa V.
Washington International Law Journal 
Volume 17 Number 1 
1-1-2008 
Reconciliation in the Wake of Tragedy: Cambodia's Extraordinary 
Chambers Undermines the Cambodian Constitutiton 
Tessa V. Capeloto 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal 
Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tessa V. Capeloto, Comment, Reconciliation in the Wake of Tragedy: Cambodia's Extraordinary Chambers 
Undermines the Cambodian Constitutiton, 17 Pac. Rim L & Pol'y J. 103 (2008). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol17/iss1/5 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright © 2008 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal Association 
 
RECONCILIATION IN THE WAKE OF TRAGEDY: 
CAMBODIA’S EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS 
UNDERMINES THE CAMBODIAN CONSTITUTION 
Tessa V. Capeloto† 
Abstract:  Between 1975 and 1979, the Khmer Rouge regime was responsible for 
approximately 1.7 million deaths caused by deportation, starvation, murder, and torture.  
In 2001, Cambodia established the Extraordinary Chambers, an internationalized 
domestic tribunal, or “hybrid court,” to prosecute the perpetrators most responsible for 
these atrocities.  As the Cambodian government’s primary legal response to the Khmer 
Rouge, the tribunal conflicts with the requirements of Article 52 of the Cambodian 
Constitution, an article that requires a policy of national reconciliation to ensure national 
unity.  Cultural conceptions of national reconciliation coupled with the legislative history 
and purpose of the constitution strongly suggest that this provision disallows the 
Cambodian government from pursuing laws and policies that undermine truth or national 
healing.  However, because of the Extraordinary Chambers’ questionable impartiality, 
limited public involvement, and constrained personal jurisdiction, this tribunal 
undermines the very truth and healing that are essential to national reconciliation.  
Cambodia should therefore look to other mechanisms of transitional justice to 
supplement its tribunal.  Given the political and economic infeasibility of a “truth and 
reconciliation commission,” Cambodia should establish informal mechanisms of 
transitional justice to supplement its tribunal and further national reconciliation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As one of thousands of killing fields sprinkled throughout Cambodia, 
Choeung Ek was a burial ground for Cambodians arrested and tortured at the 
Tuol Sleng prison in Phnom Penh.1  After prison guards tortured their 
victims, these innocent Cambodians “were usually forced to kneel at the 
edge of the mass graves while guards clubbed them on the back of the neck 
or head with a hoe or spade.”2  Researchers believe that the Khmer Rouge 
executed over 20,000 Cambodians at this site alone.3  With countless killing 
fields now a permanent part of the Cambodian landscape, the human rights 
abuses perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge are considered among the worst in 
human history.4 
                                           
†
  The author would like to thank her family, Professor Kristen Stilt, and her wonderful editors at the 
Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal to whom she owes enormous gratitude. 
1
  See Wynne Cougill, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Buddhist Cremation Traditions for the 
Dead and the Need to Preserve Forensic Evidence in Cambodia, http://www.dccam.org/Projects/ 
Maps/Buddhist_Cremation_Traditions.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2007). 
2
   Id.  
3
   Id.  
4
   Id. 
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Almost three decades after these mass killings, Cambodia established 
the Extraordinary Chambers (“CEC”) to prosecute those most responsible 
for this terror.  Neither an international nor a domestic court, Cambodia’s 
CEC belongs to a new category of tribunals referred to as “hybrid courts.”5  
Hybrid courts, or internationalized domestic courts,6 are a unique blend of 
international tribunals and domestic courts.7  Though based in the domestic 
legal system, hybrid courts maintain the international support, legal 
guidance, and expertise of an international tribunal.8 
Both Cambodian and international officials have emphasized the 
potential for Cambodia’s hybrid court to promote national reconciliation.9  
However, as the government’s primary legal response to the Khmer Rouge, 
Cambodia’s CEC undermines Article 52 of the Cambodian Constitution, 
which requires Cambodia to “adopt the policy of national reconciliation to 
ensure national unity . . . .”10  As it currently functions, the CEC is 
characterized by questionable impartiality, limited public involvement, and 
restricted personal jurisdiction.  These shortcomings weaken the very truth 
and healing that are essential to the policy of national reconciliation. 
With the Khmer Rouge trials anticipated to begin in 2008,11 an 
examination of the relationship between the CEC and Article 52 is of timely 
importance.  Part II of this comment provides a brief background of the 
Cambodian genocide, the prosecution of the worst Khmer Rouge offenders, 
and the CEC.  Part III examines Article 52 of the Cambodian Constitution, 
including the cultural meaning of national reconciliation and the 
constitution’s legislative history in order to explain “the policy of national 
                                           
5
  Etelle R. Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid Courts: Local Empowerment and National Criminal 
Justice Reform, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 347, 353 (2006). 
6
  Though this comment will focus exclusively on Cambodia’s hybrid tribunal, Sierra Leone and 
East Timor are two countries in which hybrid courts have been recently established.  See Suzannah Linton, 
Cambodia, East Timor, and Sierra Leone: Experiments in International Justice, 12 CRIM. L.F. 185, 185 
(2001). 
7
  See YVES BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AGAINST IMPUNITY: PROGRESS AND NEW 
CHALLENGES 113 (2005) (tracing the historical, political, and legal development of various international 
and domestic tribunals as well as hybrid courts such as the Extraordinary Chambers). 
8
  William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal 
Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2002). 
9
  Such officials include the Cambodian Commissioner General to the National Police.  Hok Lundy, 
Thoughts on the Khmer Rouge Regime and Trial, PHNOM PENH POST (Cambodia), Apr. 8, 2005, available 
at http://www.phnompenhpost.com/TXT/comments/c1407-6.htm.  The former United Nations Chief 
Negotiator between the U.N. and Cambodia has also expressed optimism in the tribunal’s ability to 
promote reconciliation.  Ed Cropley, UN, Cambodia Sign Deal on Khmer Rouge Trial, REUTERS, June 6, 
2003. 
10
  KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA CONSTITUTION, art. 52 (1993) reprinted in RAOUL M. JENNAR, THE 
CAMBODIAN CONSTITUTIONS (1953-1993), at 8 (1995). 
11
  Khmer Rouge Trials Ready to Start, BBC NEWS, June 13, 2007, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/asia-pacific/6747143.stm. 
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reconciliation to ensure national unity . . . .”12  It concludes that Article 52 
prevents Cambodia from enacting policies that undermine truth and national 
healing.  Part IV evaluates the legal and political limitations of the CEC, 
including an uncertain guarantee of impartiality, limited public involvement, 
and constrained personal jurisdiction.  Part V argues that as a result of these 
limitations, the CEC conflicts with Article 52 by undermining both truth and 
healing.  Finally, Part VI recommends that Cambodia should supplement its 
CEC with informal mechanisms of transitional justice that can adequately 
address the CEC’s weaknesses,13 rather than implement an economically and 
politically unfeasible “truth and reconciliation commission” (“TRC”).14  
Cambodia’s implementation of these supplemental mechanisms can help 
address the tension between the CEC and Article 52 and bring Cambodians 
closer to reconciliation in the wake of their tragedy. 
II. CAMBODIA’S MODERN HISTORY IS CHARACTERIZED BY WAR, DEATH, 
DESTRUCTION, AND DELAYED ACCOUNTABILITY 
Cambodia’s post-colonial history has been anything but calm and 
stable.  War, death, destruction, and delayed accountability have traumatized 
Cambodia since its independence from France in 1953.15  Because 
Cambodia’s history is essential to understanding its current response to the 
Khmer Rouge, a brief introduction to the atrocities committed by the Khmer 
Rouge and the events leading up to the creation of the CEC is essential. 
A. The Khmer Rouge Terrorized Cambodia Between 1975 and 1979 
In 1963, the United States launched massive air bombing campaigns 
in Cambodia, campaigns that produced mass Cambodian casualties.16  
Angered by the death and destruction caused by the United States, many 
Cambodians shifted their political support to Cambodia’s communist Khmer 
Rouge forces, thus enabling the Khmer Rouge leader, Pol Pot, to topple the 
American-supported Lon Nol government.17  Any potential for peace and 
                                           
12
  Id. 
13
  Transitional justice refers to a wide a range of approaches that societies adopt in response to mass 
human rights atrocities as these societies move from a state of violence to one of peace and stability.  
International Center for Transitional Justice, What Is Transitional Justice?, http://www.ictj.org/en/tj/ (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2007). 
14
  “Truth and reconciliation commission” is a term of art that denotes a particular institution of 
transitional justice.  See infra Part VI.B. 
15
  JENNAR, supra note 10, at 35. 
16
  BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 129.  
17
  Id. 
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stability after Lon Nol’s departure, however, quickly dissipated with the 
Khmer Rouge’s rise to power.18 
Under the Khmer Rouge regime, Cambodia suffered the worst mass 
murder of the twentieth century in terms of the percentage of its population 
killed.19  The Khmer Rouge tortured and killed many individuals perceived 
as having dangerous ethnic, political, and social identities.20  Persecuted 
peoples included the Cham (a Muslim sect), teachers, students, and religious 
leaders and institutions.21  In order to purge society of traitors within the 
Communist Party, the Khmer Rouge arrested and executed “suspected 
individuals within the leadership of each unit” as well as “all of the Party 
cadres in a unit considered treacherous.”22 
In addition to murder, the Khmer Rouge pursued policies of torture, 
slave labor, and forced evacuations while in power.23  With urban centers 
perceived as breeding grounds for dissidents, during its first week in power 
alone, the Khmer Rouge Government expelled two to three million people 
from its cities.24  The Khmer Rouge terrorized Cambodian society until 
approximately 1979.25 
In response to a full-scale invasion by the Vietnamese in December 
1978,26 the Khmer Rouge fled to the forests.  During this period, the United 
States, China, and Thailand, all enemies of Vietnam, provided continuous 
arms and support to the Khmer Rouge.27  Despite this assistance to the 
Khmer Rouge, a pro-Vietnamese government successfully installed itself in 
Cambodia shortly after Vietnam’s invasion.28  In 1991, the Agreements on a 
Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict, signed by 
Cambodia during the Paris Conference on Cambodia, established the U.N. 
                                           
18
  WILFRED P. DEAC, ROAD TO THE KILLING FIELDS: THE CAMBODIAN WAR OF 1970-1975 215 
(1997). 
19
  Craig Etcheson, The Politics of Genocide Justice in Cambodia, in INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL 
COURTS: SIERRA LEONE, EAST TIMOR, KOSOVO, AND CAMBODIA 181, 182 (Cesare P. R. Romano et al. eds., 
2004). 
20
  Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Established Pursuant to General Assembly 
Resolution 52/135, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 110(b), ¶¶ 24-28, U.N. Doc. A/53/850, 
S/1999/231 (1999) [hereinafter Report of the Group of U.N. Experts]. 
21
  Id. ¶ 26. 
22
  Id. ¶ 29. 
23
  Id. ¶¶ 19-45. 
24
  Id. ¶ 19. 
25
  See BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 129. 
26
  Scholars have advanced two competing explanations for Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia: 1) 
Vietnam wished to liberate Cambodians from the Khmer Rouge and 2) Vietnam wished to annex Khmer 
territory for purposes of Vietnamese expansion.  Ronnie Yimsut, Vietnam: Was It Liberation or Invasion, 
http://www.mekong.net/cambodia/jan7.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2007). 
27
  Report of the Group of U.N. Experts, supra note 20, ¶ 29. 
28
  BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 129-30. 
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Transitional Authority in Cambodia (“UNTAC”).29  The U.N. entrusted the 
UNTAC with organizing the elections of Cambodia’s Constituent Assembly, 
the institution that ultimately adopted Cambodia’s Constitution in 1993.30  
Only with the initiation of peace talks and the subsequent creation of 
Cambodia’s 1993 Constitution did Cambodia attain relative calm and 
stability in the years following the defeat of the Khmer Rouge.31 
B. Holding the Khmer Rouge Legally Accountable for Their Crimes 
Encountered Significant Delay 
In the decades following the genocide,32 neither Cambodia nor the 
international community took significant steps towards bringing the Khmer 
Rouge to justice.33  In 1997, the U.N. received a letter from then Second 
Prime Minister Hun Sen seeking assistance in bringing the Khmer Rouge to 
justice.34  In 1998, U.N. Secretary General (“U.N. SG”) Kofi Annan 
appointed a group of experts (“U.N. Experts”) to explore various legal 
avenues for holding the Khmer Rouge accountable.35  The U.N. Experts 
primarily considered two options:  1) an international tribunal and 2) a 
Cambodian tribunal established under Cambodian law.36 
In 1999, the U.N. Experts recommended that the Security Council or 
the General Assembly establish an ad hoc,37 purely international tribunal.38  
They argued that an international tribunal would hold the Khmer Rouge 
                                           
29
  JENNAR, supra note 10, at 7. 
30
  Id. 
31
  BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 129-30. 
32
  Between 1979 and 1997, the only Khmer Rouge political trials were Vietnamese show trials 
conducted of Khmer Rouge leaders Pol Pot and Ieng Sary.  They were both condemned to death in 
absentia.  BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 130.  Further, in 1997, a “surreal trial” of Pol Pot was conducted by 
the Cambodians.  Id.  Though condemned to life imprisonment, Pol Pot died on April 16, 1998.  Id. at 130-
31. 
33
  Initial delay resulted from the disinclination of China and the United States to reveal Khmer 
Rouge atrocities because of their prior support for the Khmer Rouge regime.  Later delay, however, 
resulted from the conflict between the U.N.’s insistence on an international tribunal and Cambodia’s push 
for a domestic court.  Id. at 138. 
34
  Id. at 131. 
35
  Id. at 132. 
36
  Identical Letters Dated 99/03/03 from the Permanent Representative of Cambodia to the United 
Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council, 53d. Sess., 
Agenda Item 110 (b), U.N. Doc., A/53/850, S/1999/231 (March 16, 1999) [hereinafter Security Council 
Letter].  The U.N. Experts most strongly considered an international or domestic tribunal for Cambodia; 
however, five possible options were technically on the table:  a tribunal established under Cambodian law; 
an ad hoc international tribunal; a hybrid option of a Cambodian tribunal under U.N. administration; an 
international tribunal established by multilateral treaty; and trials conducted in neutral states.  Id.  The other 
three options were neither strongly considered nor ultimately recommended.  Id. 
37
  BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 132. 
38
  Security Council Letter, supra note 36. 
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accountable for their crimes and discounted the possibility that a tribunal 
would incite renewed violence.39  The U.N. Experts also articulated several 
reasons for their opposition to a Cambodian court.  First, Cambodians would 
perceive purely domestic tribunals as biased.40  Based on evidence from 
government representatives, non-governmental organizations, and 
independent observers, the U.N. Experts concluded that Cambodians were 
insufficiently confident in their judiciary.41  Second, independent of the 
public’s perception, the Cambodian judiciary would not be institutionally 
capable of effectively administering justice because of internal corruption 
and judicial vulnerability to political influences.42  Additionally, the U.N. 
Experts expressed concern over insufficient resources and the absence of a 
competently staffed Cambodian judiciary.43 
The U.N. Experts also considered and rejected the immediate 
establishment of a TRC.  They expressed concern over whether the 
government would support a TRC,44 and whether a TRC could successfully 
operate with a Cambodian criminal tribunal.45  Although they acknowledged 
that a TRC could satisfy important societal interests, the U.N. Experts left 
open the idea of establishing a Cambodian TRC for future discussion.46 
Prime Minister Hun Sen vehemently opposed the U.N.’s suggestion 
that an international tribunal try the Khmer Rouge.47  Although Hun Sen 
conceded that the top leaders of the Khmer Rouge should face criminal 
prosecution, he maintained that a Cambodian tribunal was the appropriate 
forum for judging these perpetrators.48  A former Khmer Rouge member 
himself,49 Hun Sen warned, “[I]f improperly and heedlessly conducted, the 
trials of Khmer Rouge leaders would panic other former Khmer Rouge 
officers and rank and file, who have already surrendered, into turning back 
to the jungle and renewing the guerilla war in Cambodia.”50 
                                           
39
  Report of the Group of U.N. Experts, supra note 20, ¶ 108. 
40
  Id. ¶ 134. 
41
  Id.  
42
  Id. ¶¶ 133-34. 
43
  Id. ¶ 127. 
44
  The U.N. Experts noted that they were “not sure whether the Cambodian polity has yet achieved 
the level of national reconciliation needed to permit the establishment of a commission.”  Id. ¶ 204. 
45
  As the U.N. Experts stated, “if the two were carried out simultaneously and were focusing on the 
same specific episodes, considerable difficulties might result for the fair conduct of trials, including the 
tainting of evidence and the risk of inconsistent statements to the two bodies.”  Id. ¶ 205. 
46
  Id. ¶¶ 203-08. 
47
  Hun Sen became Prime Minister of Cambodia in July 1998.  Welcome to the Kingdom of 
Cambodia: Premier’s Biography, http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/unisql1/egov/english/premier.biography. 
html (last visited Feb. 12, 2007). 
48
  BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 133. 
49
  Report of the Group of U.N. Experts, supra note 20, ¶ 96. 
50
  Security Council Letter, supra note 36. 
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Given Hun Sen’s staunch opposition to a purely international tribunal, 
the U.N. ultimately abandoned this idea in 1999.51  Instead, the U.N. 
reconsidered and subsequently recommended a joint tribunal composed of a 
majority of international judges as a second-best alternative.52  In 2001,53 the 
Cambodian government enacted the Law on the Establishment of the 
Extraordinary Chambers (“CEC Law”).54  Instead of adopting the judicial 
composition endorsed by the U.N., the CEC Law provides for a joint 
tribunal with a majority of Cambodian judges.55  Though concerned with the 
composition of this tribunal, in May 2003, the General Assembly agreed to 
its establishment by approving the Draft Agreement between the U.N. and 
the Royal Government of Cambodia (“Draft Agreement”).56  Though similar 
to the CEC Law of 2001, the Draft Agreement was not identical.57  As a 
result, in 2004, the Cambodian government amended the CEC Law to 
conform to the Draft Agreement.58 
C. The Extraordinary Chambers Is a Compromise Institution Designed to 
Address the Atrocities Committed by the Khmer Rouge 
Cambodia’s recently amended CEC Law provides for a criminal 
tribunal that will prosecute “suspects,” a term defined as senior Khmer 
Rouge leaders and those most responsible for the mass killings committed 
by the Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1979.59  The CEC is a hybrid 
tribunal established within Cambodia’s existing judicial system.60  The 
                                           
51
  See BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 133-34. 
52
  See id. at 134. 
53
  Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the 
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Reach Kram No. 
NS/RKM/0801/12, July 23, 2001, (Cambodia), (amended 2004), available at http://www.cambodia. 
gov.kh/krt/ (follow law title hyperlink; then follow “2001 Law—English Translation by the Council of 
Jurists” hyperlink). 
54
  Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the 
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, as amended, Reach Kram 
No. NS/RKM/1004/006, Oct. 27, 2004, (Cambodia), available at http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/ (follow 
law title hyperlink; then follow “as amended 27 Oct. 2004” hyperlink) [hereinafter CEC Law]. 
55
  See id. ch. 3, art. 9.  
56
  Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Questions, Including Alternative Approaches for 
Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, G.A. Res. 57/228, U.N. 
GAOR, 57th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 109(b), U.N. Doc. A/57/806 (June 5, 2003). 
57
  For example, these laws contained different provisions on amnesty and witness protection.  See 
id.; see also CEC Law, supra note 54. 
58
  Id.  The Cambodian government also ratified the Draft Agreement in 2004.  See The Khmer 
Rouge Trial Task Force, Chronology of Developments Relating to the KR Trial, http://www.cambodia. 
gov.kh/krt/english/chrono.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2007). 
59
  Throughout the CEC Law, “suspect” is used as shorthand for senior Cambodian leaders and those 
who were most responsible for the Cambodian genocide.  CEC Law, supra note 54, ch. 2, art. 2. 
60
  See id.  
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tribunal will have one trial chamber, the Trial Chamber, and one appellate 
chamber of final instance, the Supreme Court Chamber.61  Both chambers 
will apply domestic and international law in their proceedings.62  In the 
CEC, Cambodian and foreign judges, prosecutors, and investigating judges 
will share center-stage.63  The Trial Chamber will include three Cambodian 
and two foreign judges and the Supreme Court Chamber will house four 
Cambodian judges and three international judges.64  One Cambodian and 
foreign prosecutor will prepare indictments for the court and one Cambodian 
and foreign investigating judge will collect evidence, hear witnesses, and 
question suspects and victims.65  In order to secure a conviction, the CEC 
Law requires, at the very least, a supermajority vote:  an affirmative vote of 
at least four judges in the lower chamber and the affirmative vote of at least 
five judges in the appellate chamber.66  For those convicted, the CEC 
imposes prison terms of five years to life imprisonment and permits the 
confiscation of private property.67  
Cambodians have suffered tremendously at the hands of the Khmer 
Rouge.  After decades of delay in holding the Khmer Rouge legally 
accountable for their crimes, the CEC promises to bring justice to a country 
ravaged by war.  However, as this Comment argues, there is considerable 
tension between the CEC and Article 52 of the Cambodian Constitution. 
III. ARTICLE 52 OF CAMBODIA’S CONSTITUTION FORBIDS CAMBODIAN 
LAWS AND POLICIES THAT UNDERMINE TRUTH OR NATIONAL HEALING 
Article 52 of the Cambodian Constitution provides that Cambodia 
shall “adopt the policy of national reconciliation to ensure national 
unity . . . .” 68  The meaning of this provision is vague and ambiguous.69  
                                           
61
  Id. ch. 3, art. 9. 
62
  The tribunal will apply international law where crimes are charged under international agreements, 
such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.  See id. ch. 2, art. 6.  
Where crimes are charged under Cambodian penal law, the tribunal will apply Cambodia’s 1956 Penal 
Code.  Id. ch. 2, art. 3.  In terms of procedure, the tribunal is to resort to Cambodian law.  See id. ch. 6, art. 
20; ch. 7, art. 23; ch. 10, art. 33.  However, where “there is uncertainty regarding their interpretation or 
application or if there is a question regarding” the consistency between domestic and international 
standards, international standards can be consulted.  Id. ch. 10, art. 33. 
63
  Id. ch. 3, art. 10; ch. 6, art. 16; ch. 7, art. 23. 
64
  Id. ch. 3, art. 9. 
65
  Id. ch. 6, art. 16; ch. 7, art. 23. 
66
  Id. ch. 5, art. 14.  
67
  Id. ch. 11, arts. 38-39. 
68
  In its entirety, Article 52 of the Cambodian Constitution states, “The Royal Government of 
Cambodia shall protect the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Cambodia, 
adopt the policy of national reconciliation to ensure national unity, and preserve the good national 
traditions of the country.  The Royal Government of Cambodia shall preserve and protect the law and 
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Cultural conceptions of national reconciliation strongly suggest that truth 
and national healing are necessary principles implicit in the policy of 
national reconciliation.  More generally, Article 52’s legislative history and 
intent support the proposition that truth and national healing are important 
principles underlying the constitution.  When viewed in light of the 
constitution and related international agreements, “the policy of national 
reconciliation” requires truth and national healing.  As a result, Cambodian 
laws and policies that undermine truth and national healing are in tension 
with this constitutional provision. 
A. Buddhist Conceptions of Reconciliation Emphasize the Central Role 
of “Truth” and “National Healing” in the Policy of National 
Reconciliation 
Political and social realities are essential for explaining Cambodia’s 
use of customs and traditions in drafting and interpreting laws.  First, many 
judges in Cambodia are inadequately trained in the law.70  Accordingly, 
judges often look to familiar traditions and customs when confronted with 
legal interpretations.71  Second, Cambodian society is characterized by “the 
weakness of the written word.”72  Instead of abiding by written rules, 
Cambodians frequently revert to customary practices.73  Third, Theravada 
Buddhism is the religion and culture of almost every Khmer, nearly ninety 
percent of the Cambodian population.74  As a result of this religious 
                                                                                                                              
ensure public order and security.  The State shall give priority to endeavours which improve the welfare 
and standard of living of citizens.”  KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, art. 52.  
Analysis of Article 52 is virtually non-existent.  Legal scholars have yet to interpret the meaning of Article 
52’s requirement that the Cambodian government “adopt the policy of national reconciliation to ensure 
national unity . . . .”  Further, the Constitutional Council, the body entrusted with interpreting the 
Cambodian Constitution, has yet to rule on this issue.  Nonetheless, until Cambodian legal scholars or the 
Cambodian Constitutional Council dictate otherwise, cultural and religious conceptions of national 
reconciliation coupled with the constitution’s legislative history provide important insight and guidance. 
69
  Article 52 illustrates the general proposition that the Cambodian Constitution suffers from 
ambiguous statements that are subject to conflicting interpretations.  See THE COMPENDIUM OF CAMBODIAN 
LAWS: VOLUME III LAWS AND REGULATIONS ADOPTED IN 1997-2000 i-25 (Sok Siphana ed., 2000) 
[hereinafter CAMBODIAN LAWS]. 
70
  See generally Ministry of Commerce: Chapter III Publication of Laws, 
http://www.moc.gov.kh/laws_regulation/legal_reform_strategy-fnal_draft4.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 
2007). 
71
  See CAMBODIAN LAWS, supra note 69, at i-26. 
72
  JENNAR, supra note 10, at 2.  For example, “an agreement made in customary form is more 
binding than a contract enumerating the obligations of the parties in writing.”  Id. 
73
  See CAMBODIAN LAWS, supra note 69, at i-26. 
74
  Richard Kollodge et al., Country Studies: Cambodia—Buddhism, http://www.country-
studies.com/cambodia/buddhism.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2007); see also KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, art. 4 (declaring “Nation, Religion, King” as the motto of the Kingdom of 
Cambodia). 
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homogeneity, Cambodians share many common traditions that are integrated 
into Cambodia’s legal framework without inciting social tension.75  Because 
Cambodian judges often try cases “based on customs, traditions, conscience 
and equity,”76 analyzing “the policy of national reconciliation to ensure 
national unity . . . .” in light of Buddhist principles is essential for 
understanding Article 52.77 
Buddhist teachings reveal that the truth is an essential component of 
reconciliation.78  Truth is learning “why things were as they were and to 
learn who [Cambodians] should blame.”79  Truth is fact.80  Buddhism 
teaches Cambodians to see the truth through the truth.81  Though the truth 
cannot change the past, it can provide lessons for the future.82 
Healing also plays a significant role in the Buddhist conception of 
reconciliation.83  For example, revered Buddhist monk Yos Hut Khemacaro 
emphasizes a “middle path” to reconciliation.84  It is a model that advocates 
compassion and non-violence to advance political processes, a model that 
reflects the Buddhist way:  “neither joining the fight nor hiding from it.”85  
Rather than preclude social action, the “middle path” provides for the 
resolution of political problems beyond “the adversarial framework implicit 
in partisanship” and by doing so, “can help the Cambodian people to find 
their own peace.”86 
Finally, Buddhism also supports the notion that the principles of truth 
and healing are consistent with ensuring national unity.  According to Yos 
Hut Khemacaro, Cambodians cannot begin to “befriend one another, have 
pity on each other, and rebuild the country toward prosperity” until national 
healing occurs and Cambodians find happiness.87  By allowing Cambodians 
                                           
75
  See CAMBODIAN LAWS, supra note 69, at i-26. 
76
  For example, although Article 47 provides that children have a duty to take good care of their 
aging patents in accord with Khmer tradition, “the meaning of ‘good care’ is defined by Buddhist and 
Khmer tradition and not by the Constitution.”  Id.  
77
  KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, art. 52. 
78
  Jaya Ramji, Reclaiming Cambodian History: The Case for a Truth Commission, 24 FLETCHER F. 
WORLD AFF. 137, 143 (2000). 
79
  Kayalan Sann & Kannitha Kim Keo, Interview with the Venerable Yos Hut Khemacarao, in 
SEARCHING FOR THE TRUTH 32, 36 (Youk Chhang & Wynne Cougill eds., 2002). 
80
  Id. 
81
  Id. at 35. 
82
  See id. 
83
  See Vannath Chea, Reconciliation in Cambodia: Politics, Culture, and Religion, in 
RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT 49, 49-53 (David Bloomfield et al. eds., 2003), available at 
http://www.idea.int/publications/reconciliation/upload/reconciliation_full.pdf. 
84
  Id. at 52. 
85
  Id. 
86
  Id. 
87
  See Sann & Keo, supra note 79, at 32. 
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to learn how and why the genocide occurred, the truth will end arguments 
arising from ignorance of the past.88  Once truth is learned, Cambodians can 
calm themselves and grow closer as a nation.89  Thus, Buddhism not only 
supports that truth and national healing are principles implicit in the policy 
of national reconciliation, it also teaches that such principles are essential “to 
ensure national unity . . . .”90 
B. Traditional Methods of Constitutional Interpretation Support That 
“Truth” and “National Healing” Are Important Principles 
Underlying the Cambodian Constitution 
Cambodian courts have yet to explicitly endorse the use of legislative 
history and intent to interpret ambiguous Cambodian legal provisions.  
Nonetheless, an analysis of recent opinions rendered by the Cambodian 
Constitutional Council,91 the body entrusted with interpreting the 
Cambodian Constitution,92 reveals that Cambodian courts commonly use 
legislative history and intent to interpret ambiguous legal provisions.  In one 
2003 opinion, the Constitutional Council used legislative intent and National 
Assembly minutes to interpret a legal provision in dispute.93  In yet another 
opinion, the Constitutional Council used “the spirit of the text for guidance” 
rather than the literal text itself.94 
The preamble to the Cambodian Constitution sheds significant light 
on the intent95 of its framers96 and in doing so, supports the conclusion that 
                                           
88
  See id.  
89
  See id.  
90
  KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, art. 52.  
91
  Opinions published by the Constitutional Council have thus far been extremely limited.  
CAMBODIAN LAWS, supra note 69, at i-27. 
92
  See Constitutional Council of Cambodia, http://www.ccc.gov.kh/english/index.php (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2007). 
93
  In interpreting the meaning of paragraph 1 of Article 124 N of the Law on the Amendment of the 
Law on the Elections of the Members of the National Assembly, the court stated, “[F]ollowing the 
precisions of the Ministry of Interior, the drafter of the bill on the Elections of the Members of the National 
Assembly, the idea is to empower the National Electoral Committee (NEC) to impose fine.”  Constitutional 
Council of Cambodia, N 058/009/2003 CC.D. (Oct. 16, 2003), available at http://www.ccc.gov.kh/ 
english/dec/2003/dec_009.html.  Additionally, the court noted, “[F]ollowing the minutes of the debates at 
the National Assembly . . . , there were [sic] no proposal to modify the initial idea concerning the draft 
articles 124 N and 124 old on this issue.”  Id. 
94
  The Council looked to the “spirit” of the text, or purpose, in rendering its ruling on the 
constitutionality of the ordinary or extraordinary plenary session of the National Assembly, paragraph 1 of 
Article 76 and Article 95 of Chapter 7 of the Cambodian Constitution.  Constitutional Council of 
Cambodia, N 054/005/2003 CC.D. (July 22, 2003), available at http://www.ccc.gov.kp/dec/ 
2003/dec_005.html. 
95
  “The Preamble is a key to opening the collective mind of the Constitution’s makers that may 
reveal the general purposes for which they made several provisions in the Constitution. The Preamble 
contains, in a nutshell, the ideals and aspirations of the people as identified by the founding fathers of the 
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truth and national healing are important principles underlying the 
constitution.  It states, “We the people of Cambodia, . . . having been 
weakened terribly, . . . determined to unite for . . . the restoration of 
Cambodia into an Island of Peace . . . and having high responsibility for the 
nation’s future destiny of moving toward perpetual progress, development, 
prosperity, and glory,  . . . inscribe the folling as the Consitution of the 
Kingdom of Cambodia[.]”97  The preamble reveals that the constitution was 
written with the intent of helping Cambodians move forward from their 
tragic past.  A country that has been “weakened terribly” can only attain 
progress, prosperity, and glory with healing;98 thus, the preamble’s reference 
to these goals suggests that the constitution was intended to encourage such 
emotional reparation.  Additionally, scholars recognize that trauma produces 
“corrosive enduring effects,” which can only disappear once the truth of 
what occurred, how it occurred, and why it occurred emerges.99 
The history of the Cambodian Constitution also supports the 
conclusion that a desire to uncover the truth influenced its drafting.  
Cambodia’s modern constitution is a product of the 1991 Paris 
Agreements100 and the subsequent deployment of the UNTAC.101  Among 
the Paris Agreements, the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political 
Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict (“Political Agreement”)102 advanced 
many principles that were later incorporated into Cambodia’s 1993 
Constitution.103 
Article 15 of the Political Agreement explicitly states, “Cambodia 
undertakes to take effective measures to ensure that the policies and 
practices of the past shall never be allowed to return . . . .”104  The preamble 
                                                                                                                              
Constitution.”  Asian Human Rights Commission, Cambodia Human Rights: Preamble, http://cambodia. 
ahrchk.net/mainfile.php/legal_reforms/462 (last visited Mar. 31, 2007). 
96
  The Constituent Assembly is the body that drafted and adopted the New Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Cambodia in 1993.  JENNAR, supra note 10, at 7. 
97
  KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at pmbl. 
98
  Id. 
99
  Robert I. Rotberg, Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation, in 
TRUTH V. JUSTICE 3, 3 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000). 
100
  The 1991 Paris Agreements include the following four documents: the Final Act of the Paris 
Conference on Cambodia; the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia 
Conflict; the Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, 
Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia; and the Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction 
of Cambodia.  Steven R. Ratner, The Cambodian Settlement Agreements, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (1993).  
101
  JENNAR, supra note 10, at 7. 
102
  Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Conflict in Cambodia, Oct. 23, 1991, 
available at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/cambodia/agree_comppol_10231991.html#part3 [hereinafter 
Cambodia Paris Agreement]. 
103
  Ratner, supra note 100, at 9.  
104
  Cambodia Paris Agreement, supra note 102, art. 15. 
JANUARY 2008 CAMBODIA’S EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS 115 
  
to the Political Agreement parallels this language.105  Though not prescribing 
particular measures for addressing the Khmer Rouge atrocities, the text of 
Article 15 and the preamble of the Political Agreement indicate that the 
constitution was drafted by individuals who recognized the need for 
effective measures to deter the reemergence of genocide.  Given the 
difficulty of deterring future abuses without first understanding past 
abuses,106 Article 15 suggests that uncovering the truth must be an essential 
element of such a measure.  As one scholar emphasizes, “[I]f societies are to 
prevent recurrences of past atrocities . . . societies must understand—at the 
deepest possible levels—what occurred and why.”107 
Cultural conceptions of national reconciliation coupled with the 
Cambodian Constitution’s legislative history and intent suggest that Article 
52 prohibits the Cambodian government from pursuing laws and policies 
that undermine truth and healing.  However, limitations on the CEC’s power 
to hold the Khmer Rouge responsible for its crimes place this tribunal in 
tension with the requirements of Article 52. 
IV. LIMITATIONS ON THE CEC WEAKEN ITS ABILITY TO HOLD THE KHMER 
ROUGE ACCOUNTABLE 
The CEC suffers from several limitations that challenge its ability to 
hold the Khmer Rouge fully accountable for its crimes and as a result, hinder 
the tribunal’s capacity to bring justice to Cambodia.108  First, the CEC Law 
fails to ensure the impartiality and the independence of the CEC.  Second, 
public participation in CEC proceedings is severely limited.  Finally, the 
CEC’s restrictive personal jurisdiction undermines its purpose. 
                                           
105
  The preamble to the Political Agreement provides, in part, “Recognizing that Cambodia’s tragic 
recent history requires special measures to assure protection of human rights, and the non-return to the 
policies and practices of the past . . . .”  Id.  
106
  As scholar Robert I. Rotberg argues, “[I[f societies are to prevent recurrences of past 
atrocities….societies must understand—at the deepest possible levels—what occurred and why.”  Rotberg, 
supra note 99, at 3.  
107
  Id.  
108
  Though the tribunal suffers from many legal and political limitations, this section will only focus 
on those CEC limitations that are relevant to the relationship between the tribunal and Article 52.  For the 
purposes of this Comment, the CEC’s limitations are those characteristics that undermine truth and/or 
national healing, principles that are implicit in the principle of national reconciliation under Article 52. 
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A. The Law Establishing the Extraordinary Chambers Fails to 
Adequately Guarantee the Impartiality and Independence of the 
Tribunal 
The CEC Law’s failure to ensure the independence and impartiality of 
Cambodia’s criminal tribunal undermines its legitimacy and ultimately its 
constitutionality.  The CEC Law’s provisions on the composition and 
selection of tribunal officials have garnered sharp criticism emphasizing the 
CEC’s vulnerability to political influence and corruption.109 
The composition of the CEC reflects the CEC Law’s failure to ensure 
impartiality.  Rather than possess a majority of international judges, the CEC 
consists of a majority of Cambodian judges in both the trial and appellate 
chambers.110  Given that the Khmer Rouge atrocities were committed by 
Cambodians, against Cambodians, and on Cambodian soil, the ideal 
composition for ensuring judicial impartiality requires that the CEC possess 
a majority of international judges.  In countries where the rule of law is weak 
and judges are highly susceptible to political bias, it is not unusual for hybrid 
courts to have a majority of international judges.111  This judicial 
composition prevents inexperienced or politically influenced domestic 
judges from hijacking judicial processes.112 
By possessing a majority of Cambodian judges, the CEC “fails to 
mitigate the risks of utilizing Cambodian judges by allowing these judges to 
exercise stranglehold control over the tribunal’s decisions.”113  According to 
the U.N. SG, “There still remains doubt . . . regarding the credibility of the 
Extraordinary Chambers, given the precarious state of the judiciary in 
Cambodia.”114  Reports on the dire state of the Cambodian legal and judicial 
system are abundant.115  As the U.N. Experts noted in their report, “given the 
                                           
109
  Michael Lieberman, Salvaging the Remains: The Khmer Rouge Tribunal on Trial, 186 MIL. L. 
REV. 164, 173 (2005). 
110
  Article 9 states, “The Trial Chamber shall be an Extraordinary Chamber composed of five 
professional judges, of whom three are Cambodian judges with one as president, and two foreign Judges.”  
CEC Law, supra note 54, ch. 2, art. 9.  This article further provides that the “[t]he Supreme Court 
Chamber, which shall be an Extraordinary Chamber composed of seven judges, of whom four are 
Cambodian judges with one as president, and three as foreign judges.”  Id. 
111
  In part, the hybrid courts of East Timor and Sierra Leone possessed a majority of international 
judges for this very reason.  See Linton, supra note 6, at 204, 234. 
112
  See Scott Luftgass, Crossroads in Cambodia: The United Nation’s Responsibility to Withdraw 
Involvement from the Establishment of a Cambodian Tribunal to Prosecute the Khmer Rouge, 90 VA. L. 
REV. 893, 936 (2004). 
113
  Id. 
114
  The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General on Khmer Rouge Trials, 1, delivered to 
the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/57/769 (Mar. 31, 2003). 
115
  Suzannah Linton, Safeguarding the Independence and the Impartiality of the Cambodian 
Extraordinary Chambers, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 327, 329 (2006).  She further explains that the “reasons for 
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ravages experienced by the Cambodian legal system over the last generation, 
it might be difficult for the United Nations to locate a sufficiently trained 
jurist who would have the expertise necessary to participate on such a 
panel.”116  Even if such a person was found, he or she would likely 
encounter significant political pressure to rule a particular way.117  In the 
worst case scenario for the CEC, three international judges would find a 
former Khmer Rouge leader guilty of genocide and four Cambodian judges 
presiding over the Supreme Court Chamber of the CEC would find this 
“suspect” not guilty despite the existence of substantial evidence of guilt.118  
With no supermajority to convict in the Supreme Court Chamber,119 the 
CEC’s appellate chamber of final review,120 the Khmer Rouge leader would 
be set free.121 
Similarly, the process of selecting the CEC’s most important officials 
has been criticized for effectively placing power in the hands of biased 
political actors.122  The CEC Law provides that the Supreme Council of the 
Magistracy (“Council”)123 shall select the CEC’s judges,124 prosecutors,125 
and investigating judges.126  Under Article 11 of the CEC Law, the Council 
must appoint the CEC’s seven Cambodian judges to the tribunal (three to the 
trial chamber and four to the appellate chamber).127  Whereas the U.N. SG 
nominates and the Council appoints the foreign prosecutor, the Council 
selects the Cambodian prosecutors from a pool of professional Cambodian 
judges.128  Article 26 provides that the Council will also select the 
                                                                                                                              
the abysmal state of Cambodia's legal and judicial system are highly complex, and derive from history, 
culture, socio-political conditions and basic human and infrastructural capacity.”  Id. 
116
  Report of the Group of U.N. Experts, supra note 20, ¶ 157. 
117
  Id. ¶ 158. 
118
  Ernestine E. Meijer, The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for Prosecuting 
Crimes Committed by the Khmer Rouge: Jurisdiction, Organization, and Procedure of an Internationalized 
National Tribunal, in INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS: SIERRA LEONE, EAST TIMOR, KOSOVO, AND 
CAMBODIA, supra note 19, at 207, 220.  CEC Law employs the term “suspect” to refer to senior Cambodian 
leaders and those who were most responsible for the Cambodian genocide. CEC Law, supra note 54, ch. 2, 
art. 2. 
119
  Id. ch. 5, art. 14.  
120
  Id. ch. 2, art. 9. 
121
  See Meijer, supra note 118, at 220. 
122
  See Linton, supra note 115, at 332. 
123
  The Supreme Council of the Magistracy is the Cambodian body that is constitutionally entrusted 
with the task of ensuring the independence of Cambodia’s judiciary as well as disciplining delinquent 
judges where necessary.  It is a body that is chaired by the king.  KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 10, arts. 113-15.  
124
  CEC Law, supra note 54, ch. 4, art. 11. 
125
  Id. ch. 6, art. 18. 
126
  Id. ch. 7, art. 26. 
127
  Id. ch. 4, art. 11. 
128
  Id. ch. 6, art. 18. 
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Cambodian co-investigating judges “from among Cambodian professional 
judges.”129 
The constitution entrusts the Council with ensuring the impartiality of 
Cambodia’s judiciary.130  At odds with this ideal is the Council’s strong 
connection to Cambodia’s ruling political party, the People’s Party.131  
Perceived as heavily biased, the Council is more likely to be concerned with 
protecting party lines than with maintaining the integrity of Cambodia’s 
judiciary.132  Although the CEC Law requires that judges, co-prosecutors, 
and co-investigators “be independent in the performance of their functions, 
and shall not accept or seek any instructions from any government or any 
other source,”133 this result is doubtful.134 
The political will to alter the judicial composition of the CEC or 
reform the Council is notably absent in Cambodia.  Despite the U.N.’s 
insistence that the CEC possess a majority of international judges, Prime 
Minister Hun Sen consistently refused and was ultimately successful in 
securing U.N. approval for a tribunal with a majority of Cambodian 
judges.135  As a result, the CEC currently possesses a judicial composition 
that undermines the impartiality of the CEC.136 
B. Cambodian Participation and Involvement in the Extraordinary 
Chambers Is Limited 
The CEC Law severely limits the scope of the Cambodian public’s 
participation in the Khmer Rouge trials.  First, although many Cambodians 
have suffered severely at the hands of the Khmer Rouge, the CEC Law 
provides victims only a minimal role in the trials.137  The only role reserved 
for victims is an opportunity to appeal an unfavorable decision to the 
                                           
129
  Id. ch. 11, art. 26. 
130
  KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, art. 113. 
131
  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2001: CAMBODIA 176 (2001), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/print/full/asia.pdf. 
132
  See Linton, supra note 115, at 332.  “Major reform is required of this body . . . . It must be 
depoliticized and its membership must reflect the separation of powers (specifically, the Minister of Justice 
must not be a member).”  Id.  
133
  CEC Law, supra note 54, ch. 4, art. 10. 
134
  Its current composition does not reflect the principle of separation of powers.  Provisions 
providing for clear, transparent, fair, and internationally-accepted criteria for appointing judges are 
currently lacking.  See Linton, supra note 115, at 329.   
135
  See BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 133-35. 
136
  See supra, Part IV.A. 
137
  For example, the CEC Law gives the co-prosecutors the exclusive role of determining who should 
face prosecution.  This means that a Cambodian victim cannot bring a criminal action against his or her 
Khmer Rouge aggressor.  See CEC Law, supra note 54, ch. 6, art. 16.  Additionally, the CEC Law provides 
no formal avenue for victims to participate in the trials.  See CEC Law, supra note 54. 
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Supreme Court Chamber.138  Allowing excessive victim participation in 
CEC proceedings could prove destabilizing.  Enabling victims to determine 
subjects for prosecution could result in revenge prosecutions, and providing 
victims a greater role in the proceedings, could produce significant structural 
and normative problems.139  Nonetheless, as it currently stands, the CEC 
Law provides insufficient victim participation.  The CEC Law allows 
victims only a minor role in the trial process:  the power to appeal a decision 
to the CEC’s court of final instance.  Victims are not offered a formal role of 
intervention at particular stages in an existing prosecution.140 
Second, the Cambodian public has no democratic control over the 
selection of the prosecuting attorney.  Under the CEC Law, the Council, not 
the public, is responsible for appointing the seven141 Cambodian judges,142 
the Cambodian prosecutor,143 and the Cambodian co-investigating judge 
who will preside over the tribunal.144  However, the Council, a body 
established to help the King satisfy his constitutional duty of ensuring the 
impartiality of the Cambodian judiciary, serves at the will of the King, not at 
the the will of the people.145  Additionally, because members of the Council 
are not elected in a public or transparent manner, the process for selecting 
Cambodian officials for the CEC is even further removed from the people.146 
Any attempt to provide greater public involvement in the CEC faces 
significant political and institutional barriers.  Continued calls to reform the 
Council remain unanswered.147  Additionally, limited public involvement 
and participation is not unique to the CEC.  As one scholar notes, “[t]rials 
focus on perpetrators, not victims” and they “afford no role in their process 
                                           
138
  Id. ch. 10, art. 36. 
139
  Jonathan Doak, Victims’ Rights in Criminal Trials: Prospects for Participation, 32 J.L. & SOC’Y 
294, 297 (2005). 
140
  Participation in criminal prosecutions varies among legal systems and countries.  For example, 
“Many continental jurisdictions permit victims to join the criminal action instituted by the state as 
‘subsidiary prosecutors’ or through an ‘adhesion’ procedure.”  Id. at 297-98.  In contrast, victim 
participation has been less substantial in common law countries.  Id. at 296.  See also United Nations 
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, G.A. Res. 40/34, 
Annex, U.N. Doc A/RES/40/34 (Nov. 29, 1985) (establishing that “the views and concerns of 
victims . . . be presented and considered at appropriate stages of the proceedings”). 
141
  Of the seven Cambodian judges, three preside at the trial court level and four preside at the 
appellate level.  CEC Law, supra note 54, ch. 3, art. 9. 
142
  Id. ch. 4, art. 11. 
143
  Id. ch. 6, art. 18. 
144
  Id. ch. 7, art. 26. 
145
  KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, arts. 113, 115. 
146
  See Linton, supra note 115, at 332-33 (noting that there is “a complete absence of transparency” in 
the selection of local judges). 
147
  Id. 
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or content for bystanders . . . .”148  To some extent, all criminal tribunals, 
including the CEC, suffer from this limitation.  Accordingly, Cambodia must 
look beyond criminal prosecutions to address this limitation of the CEC. 
C. The Personal Jurisdiction of the Tribunal Only Allows for Limited 
Prosecutions 
The personal jurisdiction of the CEC is unduly limited to “suspects,” 
“senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most 
responsible for the crimes and serious violations” of the relevant laws.149  As 
a result of the CEC Law’s failure to clearly and narrowly define “senior 
leaders” and “most responsible,” the jurisdiction of the tribunal is not only 
constrained by a literal interpretation of these terms; it is also constrained by 
the restrictive meanings to which the tribunal has accorded them.150 
The literal interpretation of “senior leaders” and “most responsible” 
limits the jurisdiction of the CEC to a few individuals, those most 
responsible for the atrocities committed at the hands of the Khmer Rouge. 151  
As one scholar postulates: 
The definitions “senior leaders” and “most responsible” 
together with the available evidence, would determine how 
many of these could be legally targeted for serious 
investigation, but my (very rough) guess is that no more than 60 
cases would fit into these categories, including perhaps 10 
senior leaders and 50 of their most responsible 
subordinates . . . .152 
Given available evidence, sixty individuals could conceivably face 
investigation under these definitions.153  Nonetheless, not all of them would 
necessarily face prosecution.154  Limiting prosecutions to the most 
responsible senior Khmer Rouge leaders allows hundreds of local Khmer 
Rouge who played a lesser, though significant, role in the atrocities to 
escape punishment.155 
                                           
148
  Martha Minow, The Hope for Healing: What Can Truth Commissions Do?, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE, 
supra note 99, at 235, 238.  
149
  CEC Law, supra note 54, ch. 2, art. 2. 
150
  See Steve Heder, The Senior Leader and Those Most Responsible, in JUSTICE INITIATIVES: THE 
EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS 53, 54 (Steven Humphreys & David Berry eds., 2006). 
151
  Id. at 55. 
152
  Id. 
153
  See id. 
154
  Id. 
155
  See id. at 54-55.  
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As a result of its failure to more precisely define “senior leaders” and 
“most responsible,”156 the CEC Law leaves the scope of personal jurisdiction 
vulnerable to the tribunal’s overly restrictive readings of these terms.157  
Heder argues that the tribunal has already explicitly articulated an intention 
to limit its prosecutions to only a handful of Khmer Rouge members.158  
Additionally, the tribunal has made such intentions implicitly known.159  To 
illustrate, as of October 2007, the CEC has charged only five Khmer Rouge 
leaders.160  Additionally, estimates do not anticipate more than seven Khmer 
Rouge leaders facing trial, though a broader reading of “senior leaders” 
could encompass more.161  Though “senior leaders” and “those who were 
most responsible” could include other Khmer Rouge members “who should, 
according to a literal interpretation of the law, be candidates for 
prosecution,” the court will likely limit prosecutions to “the leading cadre of 
the [Communist Pary of Kampuchea] central security office” and “the 
Phnom Penh torture center.”162 
Although the most immediate response to the CEC’s limited personal 
jurisdiction could be to broaden those subject to prosecution, this reform 
faces several obstacles.  The tribunal has already articulated a preference to 
limit CEC prosecutions.163  Additionally, limited prosecutions are inherent in 
the very structure of criminal trials.164  Where the charge is systematic 
human rights violations, prosecutors can only prosecute a limited number of 
defendants and crimes due to time and budget constraints.165 
The CEC is an institution that suffers from limitations that challenge 
its ability to promote justice and ensure accountability.  Although many of its 
limitations are shared by criminal tribunals in general, the CEC’s limitations 
                                           
156
  For example, to prevent the tribunal’s overly restrictive interpretation of these terms, the CEC Law 
could more precisely define “senior leaders” in terms of rank and Khmer Rouge position, or the CEC Law 
could define “most responsible” in terms of the number of crimes committed. 
157
  See Heder, supra note 150, at 54. 
158
  Id. 
159
  Id. 
160
  Seth Mydans, Khmer Rouge Hearing Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/21/world/asia/22cambo.html?_r=1&oref=slogin. 
161
  See Heder, supra note 150, at 55-56. 
162
  Id. at 54. 
163
  See id. at 54.  
164
  To illustrate, as of January 2004, ninety-one accused have appeared in proceedings before the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and forty-six accused individuals have been 
tried since the tribunal’s inception.  BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 76.  As of November 2007, the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone indicted eleven perpetrators since the tribunal’s inception.  However, one case was 
dropped after the perpetrator’s death.  About the Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.sc-
sl.org/about.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2007). 
165
  See Minow, supra note 148, at 238. 
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are particularly troublesome given Cambodia’s obligations under Article 
52.166 
V. THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL LIMITATIONS OF THE CEC CONFLICT WITH 
ARTICLE 52 BY UNDERMINING TRUTH AND NATIONAL HEALING 
Scholars have referred to the CEC as an institution of transitional 
justice intended to bring national reconciliation to the people of 
Cambodia.167  Nonetheless, as the Cambodian government’s primary legal 
response to the Khmer Rouge genocide, the CEC undermines Article 52 of 
the constitution by weakening truth and healing, principles that are implicit 
in the “policy of reconciliation to ensure national unity . . . .”168  Not only 
will the CEC Law’s failure to guarantee the impartiality of the CEC 
undermine truth, this limitation will also inspire “a resurgence of resentment, 
guilt, mourning, depression, and even a desire for revenge” among 
Cambodians.169  Additionally, because of limited public involvement and 
constrained personal jurisdiction, these trials will open old wounds without 
providing closure. 
A. The CEC Law’s Failure to Guarantee the Legitimacy and Impartiality 
of the Trials Will Taint the Truth and Generate Dissatisfaction 
Legitimacy and impartiality are essential to fostering the truth and 
justice that will help provide constitutionally mandated national 
reconciliation in Cambodia.  However, as discussed above, the CEC Law’s 
provisions on judicial composition and selection of tribunal officials call into 
question the independence and objectivity of the CEC.170  The CEC’s 
questionable impartiality undermines both truth and healing. 
If prosecutions are conducted in an unfair and biased manner or 
perceived as such, they are unlikely to uncover the truth, the reality of what 
happened, and why it happened.171  Instead, any truth that is revealed will be 
tainted by perceptions of the tribunal as dishonest, biased, or highly 
politicized. 
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Additionally, the political manipulation of CEC proceedings has led 
many Cambodians to question whether the CEC can deliver “meaningful 
justice for past atrocities.”172  Without confidence that the judicial process 
will provide justice, Cambodians cannot move forward by making amends 
with the past.173  The CEC will leave Cambodian society in a state of 
dissatisfaction and distrust, the very elements that run contrary to national 
healing.  Unless the CEC satisfies Cambodian perceptions of justice, the 
tribunal will carry the stigma of politicizing the genocide rather than 
accounting for it.174 
B. Limited Cambodian Involvement Will Undermine Healing by 
Alienating Victims 
By not actively involving victims in the process,175 the CEC will only 
alienate them.176  Providing victims a role in the process gives them a “sense 
of empowerment” and “may bring them a step closer to healing and 
rehabilitation.”177  Victim participation is essential for combating “the sense 
of powerlessness” that victims inevitably feel during proceedings.178  In 
addition, the CEC Law’s failure to provide victims a more formal role in the 
trials will undoubtedly fail to enhance their satisfaction with the process.179 
The lack of democratic control over the selection of the CEC 
prosecutor will also weaken Cambodian healing.  To some extent, all 
Cambodians are victims of the Khmer Rouge atrocities.180  The fact that the 
CEC Law entrusts the Council, an unelected body that is responsible to the 
King,181 with selecting the CEC prosecutor will result in Cambodians feeling 
as though they have no say or control over the process.182  Providing victims 
a greater role in selecting the CEC prosecutor is also important for bringing 
greater legitimacy to the criminal trials.183  As discussed above, public 
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perceptions of the CEC proceedings as illegitimate will only result in distrust 
and dissatisfaction with the process.184 
As a result of the detrimental impact that victim non-involvement 
plays in emotional rehabilitation, in recent years, a trend towards increased 
victim participation in criminal proceedings has emerged.185  Since the mid-
1980s, “the interests of victims have come to play a more prominent role in 
the formulation of policy in both domestic and international criminal justice 
systems.”186  Recognizing the need for greater victim participation, in 1985, 
the United Nations called on states to allow “the views and concerns of 
victims to be presented and considered at appropriate stages of the 
proceedings.”187  This emerging trend reinforces the importance of victim 
participation and involvement in criminal proceedings. 
C. Limited Prosecutions Will Undermine National Healing by Restricting 
Truth and Justice 
The limited and imprecisely defined scope of the CEC’s personal 
jurisdiction also undermines national reconciliation.  Read narrowly, the 
CEC law essentially grants lower-level leaders of the Khmer Rouge de facto 
amnesty for their crimes.188  In reality, these were the individuals who 
carried out, planned, or directed the the Khmer Rouge atrocities.189  
Accordingly, this effective grant of amnesty destroys the possibility of full 
reconciliation. 
If the tribunal’s restrictive interpretations of personal jurisdiction are 
motivated “by political factors, rather than impartial application of the text 
of the [CEC] Law,” the trials are unlikely to add to the truth.190  Rather, 
improperly conducted, the Khmer Rouge trials will undermine healing.191 
Additionally, the CEC’s limited prosecutions are likely to produce 
dissatisfaction and discontent with the process, results that run contrary to 
the requirements of Article 52 of the constitution.  Truth-telling is one of the 
most important moral virtues in Buddhist cultures.192  Almost all of the 
Cambodians surveyed in a recent study revealed a desire to know the truth of 
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what happened during the Khmer Rouge’s reign.193  Many victims want to 
know who killed their family members.194  They have an expectation that the 
trials will bring them truth and justice.195  Many Cambodians also have the 
expectation that the lower-level Khmer Rouge members who killed their 
mother or brother will face prosecution.196  Nonetheless, because of the 
CEC’s limited personal jurisdiction, the tribunal will unlikely satisfy 
Cambodian expectations for comprehensive truth and justice.  Accordingly, 
the CEC’s limited prosecutions will likely result in disappointment and 
despair. 
Despite arguments to the contrary, the limited personal jurisdiction of 
the CEC will not facilitate national reconciliation.  In their report, the U.N. 
Experts argued that “a reopening of the events through criminal trials on a 
massive scale would impede the national reconciliation so important for 
Cambodia.”197  Though unwilling to set a minimum or maximum, they 
estimated that twenty to thirty Khmer Rouge would face prosecution for 
their crimes.198  This number is far greater than the handful of perpetrators 
likely to be prosecuted.199  Expanding the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction 
to hundreds or thousands of Cambodians could prove socially destabilizing.  
Yet, limiting prosecutions to only a handful of “senior” Khmer Rouge 
leaders and those “most responsible” for the atrocities may prove far more 
detrimental to reconciliation.  Unduly restrictive personal jurisdiction cannot 
establish a foundation for reconciliation.  Additionally, though excessive 
prosecutions can prove harmful to social stability and reconciliation, 
“[c]ircumscribing investigation and prosecutions to an excessive degree 
could undermine the tribunal’s credibility with the public and reinforce a 
sense of impunity rather than dismantling it.”200 
The CEC possesses limitations that are in tension with Article 52 of 
the Cambodian Constitution.  These include questionable impartiality, 
limited public participation, and restricted personal jurisdiction.  However, 
Cambodia should not eliminate its criminal tribunal.  Not only will 
prosecuting several senior Khmer Rouge leaders bring some sense of justice 
to Cambodia, the CEC will also help bring Cambodia into compliance with 
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the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (“Genocide 
Convention”).201  Rather than replace the CEC, Cambodia should 
supplement its tribunal with informal mechanisms of transitional justice. 
VI. CAMBODIA SHOULD IMPLEMENT INFORMAL INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES 
TO SUPPLEMENT THE CEC RATHER THAN ESTABLISH A TRC 
Supplementing the CEC with informal institutional responses will 
help satisfy Cambodia’s obligations under the Genocide Convention as well 
as bring the CEC into greater compliance with Article 52.202 
“It is generally accepted that ‘[a] single institution on its own is 
unlikely to bring about a peaceful, stable, and restored nation.’”203  
Supplementing the CEC with a Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(“TRC”) could help address the weaknesses of Cambodia’s tribunal.  
However, not only is a TRC prohibitively expensive, Cambodia lacks the 
necessary political will for such a commission.  Thus, the Cambodian 
government should promote more economically and politically feasible 
programs such as town meetings and mental health counseling to 
supplement the CEC. 
A. Given Its Accession to the Genocide Convention, Cambodia Should 
Supplement Rather than Replace the CEC 
Cambodia should not eliminate its criminal prosecutions given its 
duty to prosecute perpetrators charged with genocide under the Genocide 
Convention.204  Cambodia acceded to the Genocide Convention on October 
14, 1950.205  The Genocide Convention explicitly requires Cambodia to 
prosecute criminal perpetrators charged with genocide.206  As the convention 
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states, “Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts,” such as 
conspiracy to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and complicity 
in genocide, “shall be punished.”207  This provision further provides that 
such persons shall be tried in a domestic or international court.208 
To the extent that it is a tribunal that prosecutes “suspects” charged 
with genocide, the CEC helps satisfy Cambodia’s obligations under the 
Genocide Convention.209  Even though the CEC suffers from limitations that 
undermine national reconciliation, the appropriate response is not 
abandoning Cambodia’s criminal prosecutions.  Rather, the appropriate 
response is supplementing the CEC. 
B. A TRC Is an Institution That Has the Potential to Promote National 
Reconciliation 
A TRC is an institution established to investigate past human rights 
violations.210  TRCs differ greatly from criminal tribunals such as the CEC in 
both purpose and design.  They provide a forum in which victims can tell 
their stories, share their traumas, and confront those who have wronged 
them.211  These proceedings frequently conclude with published reports that 
provide guidance for preventing future abuses.212  Together, the purposes and 
features of a TRC support its potential to promote national reconciliation. 
The primary purpose of the TRC is to establish the truth by resolving 
unanswered questions about past human rights violations.213  TRCs allow 
societies to learn what was previously unknown.214  In a TRC, criminals are 
brought to light and victims learn what happened to them and to their loved 
ones. 
A TRC possesses institutional features that give victims their “civil 
and human dignity by providing them with an opportunity to tell their own 
stories of victimhood.”215  It provides a forum for victims and their families 
to discuss the abuses suffered, thus creating a cathartic environment in 
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which decades of anguish, grief, fear, and hate are released.216  As opposed 
to a criminal trial, the primary focus of a TRC is on victims and their 
stories.217 
C. Significant Political and Economic Barriers Hinder the Establishment 
of a TRC for Cambodia 
Though a TRC is designed to promote national reconciliation, the 
establishment of a TRC is not appropriate for all countries.  Rather, to be 
successful in realizing the goal of truth and reconciliation, a TRC requires 
government support and proper funding.218  Given the absence of these 
important factors, a Cambodian TRC is impractical. 
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen has expressed clear disapproval 
of a Cambodian TRC.219  Hun Sen has also refused to accept a truth 
commission for lesser members of the Khmer Rouge.220  While not explicit, 
Hun Sen’s opposition to a TRC likely stems from his fear that a TRC will 
instill panic in former Khmer Rouge officers and produce further societal 
tensions.221  Hun Sen’s concerns could be addressed by providing 
perpetrators conditional amnesty—truth in exchange for freedom from 
prosecution—as was implemented by South Africa’s TRC.  Nonetheless, the 
fact that Hun Sen rejected a TRC for Cambodia after studying South Africa’s 
TRC makes this possibility unlikely.222 
A TRC also comes with significant cost.  For example, whereas the 
TRC in East Timor required approximately 3.8 million dollars to subsidize 
its two year mandate,223 Sierra Leone’s TRC cost 5 million.224  Cambodia’s 
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ability to fund a TRC is doubtful given that Cambodia has yet to secure full 
funding for its CEC.  Although the U.N. will pay the expenses of the CEC’s 
international staff and personnel, Cambodia is responsible for the expenses 
and salaries of all Cambodian personnel.225  The CEC is expected to cost 
approximately 56.3 million dollars for three years of operation.226  However, 
as of March 2006, Cambodia still lacked millions in tribunal funds.227 
D. Cambodia Should Look to Informal Mechanisms of Transitional 
Justice to Address the Tension Between the CEC and Article 52 
Rather than establish a TRC that is neither politically nor 
economically feasible, Cambodia should sponsor more feasible programs 
that can promote national reconciliation.  These programs should include 
town meetings and greater access to mental health services to aid victims of 
the Khmer Rouge.228 
Because town meetings serve different purposes and take different 
forms, Cambodian town meetings could be structured to provide truth and 
healing without the high costs and political opposition of a TRC.  The 
purpose of these meetings would be for victims and perpetrators to share 
their experiences during the reign of the Khmer Rouge and help paint a 
broader picture of the past.  To secure greater political support, such town 
meetings could be voluntary and request, though not require, perpetrators to 
disclose their crimes.  As noted above, one of the main reasons Hun Sen 
opposed the creation of a TRC was fear that a TRC would instill panic in 
former Khmer Rouge.229  To reduce costs as well as ensure greater 
legitimacy, well-respected leaders in the community could volunteer to 
preside over these meetings.  Additionally, these meetings could be held in 
public spaces instead of requiring that they be housed in lavish courthouses. 
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As a supplement to the CEC,230 town meetings could help resolve the 
tension between the CEC and Article 52.  Like TRCs, town meetings can 
provide victims a forum to share their stories without the inhibiting rigors of 
criminal prosecutions.  In contrast to criminal prosecutions, town meetings 
can provide far greater freedom on who can speak and how they can speak; 
thus, they can provide a far more comprehensive picture of the truth.231  
Additionally, in a society in which the independence of the judiciary is 
highly questionable, town meetings can provide a greater guarantee of 
impartiality than a criminal tribunal.  Although one could argue that victims 
would never attend such meetings for fear of retribution, it is promising that 
Cambodians have been willing to attend town meetings to discuss the CEC 
despite the presence of former Khmer Rouge at these gatherings.232 
The Cambodian government should also provide greater access to 
mental health services.233  The Cambodian people continue to suffer from 
severe emotional and mental trauma as a result of the Khmer Rouge 
atrocities.234  The Transcultural Psychosocial Organisation (“TPO”), an 
independent non-profit agency based in Amsterdam, currently provides 
mental health services and counseling throughout Cambodia; however, its 
centers have limited resources that reach few Cambodians.235  Thus, 
providing greater access to mental health services to Cambodia’s urban and 
rural populations would allow for Cambodians to receive the healing and 
emotional reparation that the CEC does not provide.  Although such services 
are not without cost, the government could provide such services on a 
sliding scale fee to minimize expenditures. 
These informal mechanisms may not provide the same level of 
national reconciliation that a TRC could provide, nor may they constitute the 
perfect solution to addressing the tension between Article 52 and the CEC.  
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Nonetheless, given the infeasibility of a TRC for Cambodia, town meetings 
and greater mental health care access are more practical supplements. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The upcoming Khmer Rouge trials promise to provide national 
reconciliation to a population that has suffered years of terror and trauma at 
the hands of the Khmer Rouge.  Though national reconciliation is an 
important policy generally, Cambodia’s Constitution mandates the “policy of 
national reconciliation.”236  Article 52 requires that Cambodia not pursue 
policies that undermine truth or healing.  However, the CEC’s failure to 
safeguard the impartiality and legitimacy of the tribunal and its limited 
public participation and personal jurisdiction will undermine these essential 
principles.  Though criminal prosecutions are necessary to the extent that 
they satisfy Cambodia’s obligations under the Genocide Convention, the 
Cambodian government should supplement its tribunal with mechanisms to 
promote the very reconciliation that the tribunal undermines.  Given 
Cambodia’s political and economic realities, the Cambodian government 
should look to less politically contentious and more economically feasible 
mechanisms than a TRC in order to supplement the CEC. 
Absent meaningful steps to supplement the CEC with mechanisms 
that address the tension between Article 52 of the Cambodian Constitution 
and the CEC, the Khmer Rouge trials will fail to appease the hearts and 
minds of the real victims of these atrocities, the Cambodian people. 
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